CVE-2026-57495
AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. In @agenticmail/claudecode prior to version 0.2.39, @agenticmail/codex prior to version 0.1.33, @agenticmail/core prior to version 0.9.43, and @agenticmail/openclaw prior to version 0.5.71, two inbound-mail handlers act on a privileged effect without verifying that the sender is the operator, while a sibling handler in the same repo does. The higher-impact one: any external email routed to the bridge inbox causes the dispatcher to resume the operator's Claude Code session with `permissionMode: 'bypassPermissions'`, embedding the attacker-controlled `from`/`subject`/`preview` verbatim into the prompt the resumed agent reads — an indirect prompt injection into a fully-privileged agent (Bash/Write/Edit/WebFetch + the agenticmail MCP toolbelt) running as the operator's OAuth identity. The sibling operator-query email-reply hook gates the same untrusted-From provenance with `isOperatorReplySender(replyFrom, config.operatorEmail)` (fail-closed); the bridge-wake path — a strictly higher-privilege effect — has no equivalent. @agenticmail/claudecode 0.2.39, @agenticmail/codex 0.1.33, @agenticmail/core 0.9.43, and @agenticmail/openclaw 0.5.71 contain a fix.
- Score
- CVSS 4.0 8.2 High
- Status
- Deferred - security-advisories@github.com
- Published
- 2026-07-20
- Last modified
- 2026-07-22
- Weaknesses
- CWE-306
Affected products
- Agenticmailclaudecode (Agenticmail)
- Agenticmailcodex (Agenticmail)
- Agenticmailcore (Agenticmail)
- Agenticmailopenclaw (Agenticmail)
References
- https://github.com/agenticmail/agenticmail/security/advisories/GHSA-fq4x-789w-jg5h
